Broadening the Definition of Domestic Violence in New Jersey

Last year’s change in the Prevention of Domestic Violence Act (“PDVA”) and two recent New Jersey cases are expanding what can be considered an “act of domestic violence,” for purposes of obtaining a Temporary and Final Restraining Order.  In 2015 the New Jersey legislature amended the PDVA to include a defendant’s violation of a no contact provision of a restraining order as an act of domestic violence.   This provision of the PDVA was intelligently analyzed by Judge L.R. Jones (Ocean County) for the first time in the recent case of DS v. BC (unreported August 2016). In this case, the Court indicated that a “knowing violation of a restraining order,” meets the first prong of Silver v. Silver (whether the victim has “proved by a preponderance of the evidence that one or more acts of domestic violence have taken place”) and then laid out a thoughtful analysis of this new provision of the PDVA.

The Court provided the following framework: (1) that the victim must still meet the second prong of Silver (“a restraining order is necessary to protect the victim,”), (2) that two or more separate acts even if independent of each other in the aggregate can satisfy Silver, (3) that the right to seek a restraining order based upon a knowing violation of an existing restraining order  is independent of the right to pursue a contempt proceeding and (4) this provision of the PDVA applies equally to knowing violations of both temporary and final restraining orders.

The NJ Courts’ efforts to broaden the scope of what can be considered harassment and accordingly, domestic violence, was further developed in the case of C.G. v. E.G (June 2016- Judge Jones).  The Court found that economic harassment can be considered a form of domestic violence. In this case, the defendant had contacted the victim’s employer without her consent and attempted to interfere with her employment by bothering her employer and her employer’s wife and embarrassing the victim.  These two cases and the legislative change to the PDVA in 2015 point to the fact that Courts are to view potential acts of domestic violence with a much wider lens and that abuse can come in many forms.

For more information or for assistance with a domestic violence matter, please contact Georgia Fraser, Esq. of Fraser Family Law Office at (609)223-2099.

When Can an Application to Terminate or Modify Alimony due to Retirement be Made?

Since the modification of the New Jersey alimony statute in September 2014 litigants and attorneys have been grappling with how Courts will address many of its new provisions.  NJSA 2A:34-23(j)  provides that “alimony may be modified or terminated upon the prospective or actual retirement of the obligor,’ but up until recently there was no guidance in case law as to when a Court might consider such an application based upon a “prospective”future retirement date.

In August 2016, the case of Mueller v. Mueller (an Ocean County Chancery Division case) was approved for publication.  This case establishes a standard for what might be considered the timing of such an application. Judge Jones indicates in this case that a prospective retirement five years in the future was too far in advance for the Court to consider an application to terminate alimony.  However, the Court suggests that 12 to 18 months prior to actual retirement is the more appropriate timing of such an application.

For more information on applications to terminate or modify alimony, or other family law issues, please contact Georgia Fraser, Esq. of Fraser Family Law Office LLC at (609)223-2099.

Are the Court’s Considerations in Pendente Lite Support Applications changing under the New Alimony Statute?

One of the most common applications made in family court is for what is called pendente lite support. This support is supposed to maintain the “status quo” of the marriage while the parties participate in the divorce litigation and head toward either an amicable resolution of their case or a final decision by the Court via a trial.  It is essentially supposed to “bridge the gap between the beginning and the end of a divorce proceeding.”  Historically,  Courts have predominantly considered the marital lifestyle and the needs of the supported spouse to maintain that status quo in determining pendente lite support.

A recent Ocean County Chancery Court decision, Malek v. Malek, (published August 23, 2016) is calling into question whether Courts are obligated to go beyond  “marital lifestyle” and “status quo,” considerations in pendente lite applications under the new statute. The Court in Malek  finds that the 2014 amendment to the alimony statute requires that Courts consider all of the statutory factors for alimony under N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23 (not just marital lifestyle and need) and to specifically to consider: (1) the practical impact of the parties’ need for separate residences and attendant increase in living expenses on both parties’ ability to maintain the marital standard of living; (2) that neither party has a greater entitlement to the standard of living of the marriage; (3) that no statutory factor carries more weight than any other factor; and (4) that the amount, nature and length of pendente lite support is to be considered in the final alimony award. 

For more information regarding pendente lite support applications or any other family law issues, please contact Georgia Fraser, Esq. of Fraser Family Law Office LLC at 609-223-2099.

CHANGES IN FAMILY LAW: TERMINATION OF CHILD SUPPORT UNDER NEW EMANCIPATION STATUTE

In January 2016, New Jersey enacted a new emancipation statute that is more payor friendly and which establishes that any existing or future child support obligation will terminate automatically when a child reaches the age of 19 absent an order stating otherwise, consent of the parties or the Court’s extension of the age for emancipation beyond 19 based upon an application filed by the payee parent. This new law is set to take effect on February 1, 2017 and will apply to all child support orders issues before or after its effective date.

One of the other key components to this new law is to create a “cap for termination,” that if another age for the termination of child support is specified in a Court Order, it is not to extend beyond the date that the child reaches the age of 23.  Although most Marital Settlement Agreements already incorporate the age of 23 as the cap for when child support terminates, the statute now codifies that age cap.  A child beyond the age of 23 can still seek other forms of financial support, reimbursement or contribution by their parent, but the difference is that it will not be deemed payable or enforceable as child support.  Further, parties can agree in a settlement agreement to additional financial responsibility for children beyond the age of 23, but it cannot be considered “child support.”

If there is an existing unallocated child support award that covers two or more children, the new law indicates that the termination of a child support obligation for one child does not terminate the existing child support obligation. If allocated, the child support would be adjusted by the support for the child deemed emancipated.

The first notices of child support termination will be mailed out on February 1, 2017 with child support ending on August 1, 2017, as the new law is phased in. If you are already divorced, it is important to read the child support provisions of your Court Order or Marital Settlement Agreement and consult with a family law attorney to understand how this change in the law may affect you.  If you are considering divorce or in the process of getting divorced, it is important to understand how this law affects the negotiation of support and the resolution of your case.

For more information regarding the new emancipation statute, or guidance on other family law issues, contact Georgia M. Fraser, Esq. of Fraser Family Law Office LLC at 609-223-2099.